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Last Tangle in Tibet

By Steve Weissman

Early in 1971 the United States Information Agency (SUIA) completed a 13-minute documentary film on Tibet. Made in Switzerland with the help of Tibetan refugees, it portrayed the Chinese Communist take-over of Tibet, ending in the 1959 "flight to freedom" of the youthful god-king, the Dalai Lama. But USIA never released "Man From a Missing Land." In July President Richard Nixon announced that he would visit Peking and the film was shelved. American enthusiasm for Tibet had cooled.[1]

The film and its suppression was only a footnote to Washington's growing friendship with China, and was easily lost in the back pages of the New York Times. But the story deserves telling as the final chapter in a Cold War masterpiece, a twenty-year thriller which sent Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in pursuit of the Dalai Lama, trained Tibetan guerrillas in the Colorado Rockies, and used the ragged refugees to help push once-neutral India into a war with China.

Forbidden Kingdom

Washington discovered Tibet during World War II, when Japanese forces blocked the Burma Road, the life-line to Chiang Kai-shek's forces in "Free China." Almost immediately the top-secret Office of Strategic Services (OSS) ordered Col. Ilia Tolstoy, grandson of the Russian novelist, to go from British India through Tibet "to discover ways and routes of transporting supplies to China." Tolstoy negotiated permission to travel as far as the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, and at the end of September, 1942 he and Capt. Brooke Dolan II set off. They reached Lhasa in December, won the goodwill of the Dalai Lama's government, and continued the difficult and militarily unpromising trek into China.[2]

That was the story as Col. Tolstoy reported it to the readers of National Geographic. But the journey to Lhasa had a political side as well. Ever since the Manchu Emperor of China conquered the Tibetans in the early 18th Century, the Chinese had claimed that Tibet was part of China.[3]

With the Japanese already in Burma and the Chinese and British weakened by war, however, the American Department of State wanted to contact the Tibetans directly and assure them that "the US has no axe to grind in Middle Asia," as Tolstoy put it. Tolstoy was even more explicit. He wanted Washington to back the Tibetans against China.[4]

Soon after, a group of Tibetan officials attempted to force Chiang Kai-shek's Representative in Lhasa to work through a newly-created Tibetan Bureau of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese were furious: as part of China, Tibet had no right to act as an independent country. The Chinese forced the Bureau to close and accused Britain and the United States of backing the would-be separatists.[5]

Britain and America backed down.

"The Government of the United States has borne in mind the fact that the Chinese Government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet and that the Chinese Constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China," declared the Department of State.

"This Government has at no time raised a question regarding either of these claims."[6]

INSIDE:

Georgetown U. Panel on the Philippines--page 18

United Nations on Multinational Corporations--page 20

Research Notes--page 21

DS
785
W4

Col. Tolstoy had also urged Washington to give officials in Lhasa long-range radio equipment so they could keep closer tabs on the remote backlands. But Washington had been dubious. China would not "have any control over the transmitter or the material broadcasted" and would therefore "not welcome the introduction to Tibet of such a potent facility," the State Department argued.[7]

The issue hung in the balance until late 1943, when an American C-87 flying the hump from China's Yunnan Province to India strayed over central Tibet and crashed near Lhasa. Tibetan authorities aided the downed crew and in gratitude Washington gave them the broadcasting equipment.

Lowell Thomas Brings The News

The Tibetan separatists continued to jockey for position, keeping outside contact through the British Representative in Lhasa and a handful of hardy Western visitors.[9] Then in February of 1948 the separatist leader Tsepon Shakabpa journeyed to New Delhi with a Tibetan military official. Traveling with only a Tibetan passport, the "trade mission" continued on to Great Britain and the United States, where Col. Tolstoy introduced them to Gen. Eisenhower and other American leaders.[10]

The upshot of all this was dramatic. Shakabpa returned home and in July of 1949 Lhasa formally broke relations with China and expelled Chiang Kai-shek's officials.[11]

The Chinese protested. The Indians sent a high-ranking officer to Lhasa to set up a program of military aid. Aided by two British radio operators, the Tibetans used their American radio equipment to set up communications along the border with China.[12]

But Chiang had his hands full elsewhere. The Chinese Communists were winning the civil war. In 1949 Chiang fled to Taiwan, soon to be followed by most of his army and administration. The Chinese opponents of Tibetan independence were no longer America's friends. They were Communists!

The rapidly evolving events in Tibet brought two American visitors that August — the globe-trotting radio commentator Lowell Thomas and his son Lowell Jr. They had sent word through the American Ambassador to India Loy Henderson that they wanted to see Lhasa, and Shakabpa had convinced his wary colleagues to permit the visit, hoping "to inform America of the Red Threat to Tibet."[13]

The Thomases did just that. Lowell Sr. won sympathy for Tibet's anti-Communists with his daily broadcasts; father and son collaborated on a series of magazine articles; Lowell Jr. published a full-length book entitled Out Of This World. The Thomases also conveyed to President Truman an "unofficial" request for modern weapons and advice on guerrilla warfare."[14]

Did the Thomases represent the United States Government?

"Decidedly not," insisted Lowell Thomas Jr.

"We were in Tibet as private citizens, not as official representatives of the United States. Naturally we had no authority to offer them any encouragement. All we could venture was our belief that our country would be sympathetic, but that actual material aid would depend chiefly on United States public opinion as reflected in the action of Congress," he argued.[15]

Lowell Thomas Jr. admitted that this status had confused the Tibetans, while a close observer reported that they were more than just confused. The Tibetans maintained that Lowell Thomas Sr. had led them to believe he had official influence. That is why they invited him to Lhasa and why they gave him an official reception. When he then denied any official status, the Tibetans were upset and suspected a cunning political move.[16]

The Tibetans were probably right. Washington often used "unofficial" representatives to avoid committing itself.

In any case the "unofficial" request for arms and advice forced Washington to consider making an official commitment. Truman had earlier recognized China's claim to Tibet by refusing to receive the envoy Shakabpa unless he were accompanied by the Nationalist Chinese Ambassador, and the Nationalists were still pressing their claim.[17] But if the United States would now recognize Tibet as an independent country, the administration could make available China Area Aid Funds for a new front against the Communists.[18]

The Administration finally decided against overt recognition and aid, much as it decided at the time, against openly defending Taiwan (Formosa).

"Any attempt on the part of the United States openly to deny Chinese territory such as Formosa to the Communists would probably react to the benefit of the Communists by rallying anti-foreign sentiment to their side," the National Security Council decided in December 1949.[19]

Washington also foresaw military difficulties, as they explained to Lowell Thomas Jr.

"If the United States offers any kind of military assistance to Tibet, our country must assume the responsibility of maintaining Tibetan independence. But if the Chinese Reds call our bluff, how could we move an army over the Himalayas? How could we supply it? In the final analysis the United States is not the nation to undertake the task," he



Note: Boundaries are from U.S. State Department maps.

recounted.[20]

That left the possibility of channeling aid through India, and an Indian observer asserts that Truman did offer air transport to help the Indians defend Tibet.[21] But official policy was "hands off."

"The United States will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China," declared Truman in January.[22]

First Flight of the Dalai Lama

In March, 1950 American officials in India met with George Patterson, a Scottish medical missionary who claimed to hear the voice of God. The mystical Patterson had just spent three years with the Khamba tribesmen of Sikang (Kham), a Chinese province situated between the jurisdiction of the Tibetan government in Lhasa and the western edge of Chinese settlement. He had come to warn that the Chinese Communist government would soon attack Lhasa.[23]

Patterson — known as the bearded Khamba — explained that two wealthy Khamba chieftains had been planning with leaders of the neighboring Amdo Tibetans to stage their own attack on Lhasa. But before they could start the Communists "invited" them to help lead a very different "East Tibet People's Revolution Against the Corrupt, Reactionary Government in Lhasa." Fearful of the Communists, the Khamba leaders sent Patterson to seek help for a Tibetan guerrilla war against the Chinese.[24]

Patterson told his story to British, Indian, and American officials in Calcutta. He also met in New Delhi with Ambassador Henderson, who helped arrange a special shipment of streptomycin for the ailing wife of one of the Khamba chiefs. But the Americans were "not in a position to do anything even if they had wanted to," Patterson wrote in his Tragic Destiny.[25]

The tribal leaders were on their own, and when China launched its "liberation" of Tibet in October 1950, they chose to collaborate as vice-presidents of the East Tibet People's Government."[26]

Unable to return to Sikang, Patterson joined the large colony of wealthy Tibetan emigres in the northern Indian trading town of Kalimpong, keeping in touch with the Khambas through occasional letters. Then, in June, 1951, he received a most unexpected caller — the monk Thubten Norbu, abbot of an important monastery in Amdo and eldest brother of the Dalai Lama.[27]

Norbu had just fled from the Communists and was acting as a special envoy from his brother to India and the Western Powers. He asked for Patterson's help, and "the Bearded Khamba" rushed off to Calcutta. This time Patterson's news "created a sensation and the diplomatic telephone between New Delhi, London, and Washington burned with questions and answers."[28]

The situation in Tibet was tense. The Communists had beaten Lhasa's army and now demanded that the Dalai Lama's government accept a 17-Point Agreement guaranteeing Tibetan autonomy under Chinese rule. But the Dalai Lama, after celebrating his final enthronement as ruler, had rushed off to Yatung, a Tibetan town seven miles from the border with Sikkim. "Private Americans" had reportedly offered to evacuate the god-king by air from Lhasa, while Life dramatized the move to Yatung in a 10-page photo story on the "Flight of the Dalai Lama."[29]

Would the Dalai Lama accept China's terms and return to Lhasa? Or would he join his brother in fleeing?

Thubten Norbu weighed these alternatives with American officials in Calcutta and reached a tentative understanding. The Americans would support the Dalai Lama in exile, back an appeal by Tibet to the United Nations, and "provide finance for whatever was required in Tibet's fight for freedom," Patterson explained. In return the Dalai Lama would repudiate the 17-Point Agreement and flee Tibet. Norbu relayed the proposal to Yatung and as late as mid-July the Dalai Lama and his entourage were pondering which way to turn.[30]

It was at this point that Justice Douglas appeared on the scene. An avid mountaineer, Douglas was spending his summers in the rugged northern borderlands of South Asia and the Middle East — a "self-appointed, one-man research project on Communism," according to one observer. Douglas described what he saw in numerous speeches, magazine articles and books. He acted on it as director of the International Mass Education Movement and chairman of the Institute for Rural Reconstruction in the Philippines, two outgrowths of earlier American-financed efforts to woo the peasants of China from Communism. Douglas was also an early supporter of a little-known Vietnamese politican named Ngo Dinh Diem.[31]

Douglas was a "fellow-traveler" of the Thomases as well, and had been with Lowell Jr. in Iran when permission came from Lhasa for the 1949 visit.[32] Now in the Summer of 1951 he was on a well-publicized walking trip in the Indian Himalayas, with plans for an unannounced stop-over in Yatung.

"I had a letter to the Dalai Lama and had arranged to visit him there," Douglas later explained in his Beyond the High Himalayas.[33]

"The family of the Dalai Lama and many influential people in the hierarchy pleaded with him not to return to Lhasa. They pointed out that if he did, he would be a ready victim of Communist intrigue. The Communists would work to liquidate the system of landlordism on which the monasteries depended. The Communists would appropriate the wealth of Tibet to their own ends, robbing the church. The Communists would undercut the authority of the Dalai Lama, making him a mere vassal," Douglas recounted.[34]

But "there were other arguments I was carrying to Yatung to present as forcefully as possible to the Dalai Lama. There is reason to believe that the Dalai Lama understood this point of view and was sympathetic with it," he concluded.[35]

What were these other arguments? Douglas doesn't say in so many words, but his overall point of view suggests an answer.

Justice Douglas was already convinced that Washington should recognize Peking to help "pry Red China loose from Russia," and he used his return from the Himalayas to argue the case.[36] Douglas was also among the first to condemn Washington's "military attitude toward the problems of Asia." But he agreed with the military-minded that America should save Asia from Communism, differing only over how best to do it. Douglas favored the soft strategy.

"The military knows only how to destroy. We need to do a vastly more difficult work. We need to create tolerance, understanding, and good will in the world," he argued.

"There are revolutions in the world which need management and direction."[37]

To do that, Douglas favored foreign aid: "He wants to feed, clothe, educate and cure the common folk of the world," observed journalist Louis Fisher.[38] But Douglas was even more concerned with winning the hearts and minds of

Asia, and that is why he pursued the Delai Lama. America's most liberal Supreme Court Justice wanted the god-king of Tibet to symbolize anti-Communism to Asia's all-important Buddhists.

"Millions upon millions look to the Dalai Lama as spiritual head of the church. The measure of their resistance to Communism may be dependent on the word from him," Douglas explained.[37]

But before the American Justice could reach Yatung, the Dalai Lama left for Lhasa. Douglas and his colleagues would have to wait eight long years for the "Flight to Freedom."[40]

That left Thubten Norbu. The CIA had already flown the Buddhist monk to New York as the guest of its newly-created Committee for a Free Asia.[41] It had also appointed as his "counsellor and guide" Major Robert Ekvall, a former missionary among the Amdowas and, officially, a just-retired Far Eastern specialist in Army Intelligence. Ekvall helped Norbu in Washington and in English courses at Berkeley, and then returned to the Army as a high-level interpreter at the Korean Truce Talks and the 1954 Geneva Conference.[42]

During his first year in the United States Norbu kept contact with the Dalai Lama through Patterson and the U.S. Consulate in Calcutta, and through another brother who visited in 1952. Norbu then traveled throughout Asia, meeting with Buddhist leaders in Japan, Burma, Ceylon and Thailand. He also conferred with the Dalai Lama in 1956, when the brothers visited India for the 2500th Anniversary of the Buddha's attainment of Nirvana.[43] By this time the Committee for a Free Asia had become the Asia Foundation and was gaining interest in the anti-Communist possibilities of "The Buddhist Alternative."[44]

Between trips Norbu continued to study English, becoming a guest of Church World Service, an agency affiliated with the National Council of Churches. His friend Ekvall had meanwhile become chairman of the "Inner Asia Research Project" at the University of Washington in Seattle, working alongside China-scholar George Taylor, a key advisor to the Asia Foundation. Norbu joined the project in 1958, and in the following years it received funds from the Rockefeller Foundation to host other refugee Tibetan scholars and from the Asia Foundation to help the old envoy Shakabpa complete a political history of Tibet.[45]

Patterson was pleased: "Tibet, instead of being quietly annexed and isolated, had an important link with the West."[46]

The Liberation of Tibet

China's take-over of Tibet violated the "bourgeois" principle of national self-determination. It also violated the Chinese Communists' Constitution of 1931, which guaranteed the right of the Tibetans, Mongolians and other ethnic minorities "to complete separation from China, and to the formation of an independent state for each national minority."[47] But it did not signify any "blue-printed plan of conquest" against the rest of Asia.

India had claimed the right to fill out the borders formerly claimed by the British Raj and to dominate the former British protectorates in the Himalayas — Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal.[48] The Indians also used force against *their* "Tibetans," the highly-literate and largely Christian Nagas of the Northeast.[49]

China's Communists were doing the same thing, following in the footsteps of *their* imperial predecessors. To the Chinese, Nationalist as well as Communist, Tibet was an internal affair.[50]

Communists could also view the take-over as revolution.

"In Tibet, the nobility are a race apart. A wide chasm yawns between them and farmers, herdsmen, and other humble commoners," wrote Lowell Thomas, Jr., despite his support for the Tibetan anti-Communists.

"The peasant bows low before the landlord or official and uses a different and meekly respectful vocabulary in addressing the noble class. The peasants on landed estates are bound to the soil much as were the European peasants in feudal times."[51]

Buddhism in Tibet was cut from the same cloth. The high-ranking monks were part of the nobility, the monasteries monopolized the best land, and religious superstition sanctified the injustice.

Democracy?

"Incarnate lamas often chose to be reborn in humble families," and that was democratic, argued the Dalai Lama.[52]

Social justice?

"Almsgiving was one of the fundamental obligations of our religion," Thubten Norbu explained, defending the existence of so many beggars in Tibet.[53]

If any country needed revolution, it was Tibet. But there were so few Tibetan Communists that the Chinese had to make the revolution through those who least wanted it — the Dalai Lama, the more cooperative Panchen Lama and "progressives" from the upper strata of monks, landlords and tribal chiefs. This produced "a remarkably mild and affable administration," as Western observers saw it. But it also waylaid the drastic reforms needed to rouse the Tibetan peasant, whose lot remained something less than affable.[54]

The Chinese Communists added to the problem. They never understood the semi-nomadic tribesmen, whom they often dismissed as "bandits." They also brought in Chinese settlers, exhibiting what they later criticized as "Great Han Chauvinism."[55] Exporting revolution has never been easy.

But Peking saw little choice. Remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army remained in Sikang and Tibet, as well as in Mongolia and Sinkiang to the north, Yunnan and Burma to the South. This was the traditional arc of opposition to central authority, and the fleeing Nationalists stood ready to rouse the largely non-Chinese populations against Peking. No Chinese government could ignore the threat, especially after the "foreign devils" invaded North Korea in October 1950.[56]

Liberation American-Style

Washington was also involved in "liberation." In June, 1949 American Intelligence had created the National Committee for a Free Europe, bringing together anti-Communist emigres for radio propaganda, espionage and the proposed liberation of Eastern Europe. The Americans also organized at least one guerrilla raid on Albania, maintained ground contact with anti-Communist guerrillas behind the "iron curtain," and trained their own refugee army. A parallel apparatus undertook the "liberation" of the Soviet Union.[57]

Washington extended this program to China by early 1951. The Free Europe group spawned the Committee for a Free Asia and its Radio Free Asia, while CIA-trained Chinese Nationalists invaded Yunnan, staged commando raids from the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and para-dropped guerrilla fighters onto the mainland.[58] The CIA also reorganized the Taiwan-based Civil Air Transport to provide planes and pilots for its covert and clandestine projects. Now Air America, the airline conducted "more than 200



overflights of Mainland China and Tibet," according to a 1961 memo by General Edward Lansdale, reprinted in the Pentagon Papers.[59]

The United States would not wage war against China openly, as many hard-liners wanted. It would "promote disintegration from within."[60]

The National Security Council made the policy official in May, 1951. The United States would "foster and support anti-Communist elements both outside and within China with a view to developing and expanding resistance in China to the Peiping (sic) regime's control, particularly in South China."[61]

America Backs The Rebels

Washington had no difficulty finding anti-Chinese elements to foster and support in Tibet. In May of 1952 top officials in Lhasa created a "People's Party," which managed over the years to carry out passive resistance, pamphleteering and mass protest. They kept in touch with the tribesmen to the East as well, reportedly contacting dissident Khamba leaders when the Dalai Lama and his entourage traveled to and from China in 1954-55.[62]

The Dalai Lama also reconsidered fleeing Tibet, and while he was in India in 1956 he discussed the possibility with Prime Minister Nehru (and reputedly with American officials). Nehru argued against it, but the Buddhist leader returned to Lhasa only after arranging to leave behind former Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhang, who gave new life to the anti-Chinese cause in Kalimpong, and yet another brother, who later joined Thubten Norbu in the United States.[63]

Resistance was even stronger in the East, and by late 1952 one of the Amdo chiefs collaborating with the Communists decided that the time was again ripe for revolution. But first wanting assurances of American aid, he sent an envoy to Kalimpong to seek out Thubten Norbu. Norbu was gone, the envoy turned to George Patterson, and the Scotsman passed the word to the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and to the Americans in India.[64]

The Amdo visitor reported that small bands of Khamba, Amdo and Golok tribesmen were already attacking Chinese posts, and that twelve to fourteen thousand pro-Chiang Kai-shek Chinese Moslem troops were holding out in Sikang (Kham). The pro-Chiang Moslems, equipped with long-range radios, were receiving supplies from "Chinese Nationalist planes operating from Formosa."[65]

The planes actually flew out of an intermediate base, probably in Thailand, since the distance from Taiwan was too great for piston aircraft. They were most likely from the fleet of the CIA's "proprietary," Civil Air Transport, Inc.[66]

Patterson played middle-man again in 1954, initially for the Indians. New Delhi had just recognized Tibet as a region of China and pledged in the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" to refrain from any intervention in China's internal affairs. But recalling Britain's traditional influence in Tibet, Indian officials asked Patterson to arrange a meeting with one of the Khamba chiefs. The Khambas arrived in Kalimpong in March 1955, and found that India would not back a full-scale revolution against her Chinese friends. Would the Americans? Washington flew out a special agent, and after four days of talk he proposed a tentative ten-year program for a nation-wide Tibetan Revolution.[67]

Patterson grew frustrated, hearing nothing further from the Americans. But the Khambas did begin a series of major revolts the following February, and the Americans did step up their support dramatically.[68]

One participant in the new support was the CIA's Anthony Poe, a guerrilla warfare expert later active in sending Laotian hill tribesmen on espionage missions into South China. According to war correspondent Michael Morrow, Poe "helped organize Tibetan CIA-aided insurgents, escorted them to Colorado for training and finally went back with them into Tibet."[69]

The training was at Camp Hale high in the Colorado Rockies. It began as early as 1958, as veteran spy watcher David Wise explained in The Politics of Lying. The program was highly classified, but in December 1961 a group of Coloradans reported seeing "15 Oriental soldiers" scrambling from a bus with its windows painted black into a waiting C-124 transport plane.[70]

With this backing, the tribesmen continued to fight, spreading the revolt westward despite mounting Chinese attacks. By June, 1958 several thousand were in and around Lhasa, where they united with the anti-Communist officials to proclaim a new nation-wide movement, the Chul-ka-Sum. The new coalition also sent delegates to Kalimpong to join with emigre Tibetans in a Manifesto of Independence and Appeal to the United Nations.[71]

Tension mounted; rumors spread that the Chinese would abduct the Dalai Lama, and in Kalimpong, Patterson reported the growing unrest to the English press. Then in March, 1959 the new coalition of Lhasa officials and Eastern tribesmen staged a series of large-scale demonstrations. The Chinese replied with armed force, and in the resulting confusion the rebels helped the Dalai Lama make his final "flight to freedom."[72]

"It was said within the CIA's Plans Division, that a few of the guerrillas from Camp Hale were among those who helped to guide the Dalai Lama through the mountain passes and over the border to safety in India," David Wise reported.[73]

It was a brilliant operation, but only part of a larger picture. In the months before the uprising in Lhasa, the Americans had helped overthrow the neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma in Laos, participated in new provocations from Quemoy and Matsu, and apparently sent U.S. planes over Yunnan and North Vietnam. According to the Chinese,

the Americans had also helped set up special forces camps inside Yunnan.[74] Then, after the anti-Communist Tibetans made their move, Nationalist Chinese officials on Taiwan boasted of "close contact" with the rebels, promised additional aid, and predicted a merger of anti-Communist forces in China."[75]

Was the Eisenhower Administration purposefully trying to provoke the Chinese Communists into an all-out war? Had some "War Conspiracy" or "Secret Team" subverted official policy, as several new studies have suggested? Or was this strange chain of events simply the logical outgrowth of the earlier liberation policy?[76]

Official secrecy makes it difficult to know. But whatever the cause, the provocation was real, particularly in Tibet. The U.S. had involved itself in direct action against the Chinese. As Air Force veteran Fletcher Prouty put it, "If the Dalai Lama is spirited out of Tibet in the face of an overwhelming army of conquerors, are the Chinese going to think he found his support in heaven?"[77]

La Guerre est Fini

The tribesmen continued to fight, seeking refuge along the border with India and the Himalayan protectorates. As late as 1966 the French anthropologist Michael Peissal spotted secret caravans carrying arms to Khamba war camps inside the Nepali kingdom of Mustang. He talked with several Khamba soldiers and observed that they were "acting like a foreign occupation army."[78]

Peissal also learned that the United States had flown helicopters into Mustang on at least four occasions, hoping to set up a radio receiving station that could "listen in" to Tibet and China.[79]

Washington continued to train the tribesmen, at least until the "15 Oriental soldiers" were spotted in Colorado in December, 1961. The CIA seems to have closed Camp Hale at that point, possibly, as David Wise suggested, fearing that critics would see it as the beginning of a Bay of Pigs against China.[80] But within a year the Indians were training Tibetan guerrillas at Dehra Dun and the U.S. was supplying guerrilla specialists to India.[81]

The Chinese Nationalists also lent a hand. "Taiwan-financed agents" in Kathmandu had recruited Michael Peissal's aide Tashi, an Amdo refugee, and sent him over the border into Tibet in 1962.

"The Nationalist Chinese enrolled a fair number of Amdo Tibetans into its army and redirected them through parachute missions and by other means into Tibet," Peissal wrote in his book Mustang.[82]

The continuing overflights are harder to pinpoint. In September, 1960 Peking charged that American planes had been taking off from Bangkok, passing over Burma or China, and then crossing the Chinese-Indian border to parachute weapons, supplies and wireless sets to secret agents deep in Chinese territory.[83] Burma managed to force down one of the overflights the following September and found it was manned by Chinese Nationalists.[84]

Washington often used Nationalist planes and pilots, but the timing of this particular flight is interesting. The previous April, Francis Gary Powers flew over the Soviet Union in an American U-2. The Soviets shot him down, along with a planned Summit Meeting, and a sadder-but-wiser Eisenhower banned all American overflights, including those to Tibet. Officials later reinstated them but American officials might have relied on their Nationalist allies in the interim.[85]

India's part in the fancy flying also raises questions. In 1960 Washington sold New Delhi some surplus C-119 Flying Boxcars, reportedly at reduced prices, to help supply Indian outposts along the disputed Himalayan border with China and Tibet. In 1962, Peking accused New Delhi of overflying Chinese territory. In fact, the Indians probably did send planes to supply troops stationed in areas claimed by China. But it is possible that the Indians were also flying guerrilla tribesmen back into Tibet.[86]

In the end, of course, the Tibetan Revolution itself fizzled. Patterson claimed that "the Chinese launched a ruthless campaign to exterminate the rebels still in the country and eliminate any possibility of a similar rebellion in the future."[87] More scholarly observers, though sympathetic to the anti-Communists, reported that "the Tibetan insurgents never succeeded in mustering into their ranks even a large fraction of the population at hand, to say nothing of a majority." The CIA, the Dalai Lamma and the tribal chieftains might have seen their operation as a national revolution; but the average Tibetan did not.[88]

From Lhasa to New Dehli

Washington had failed. The people of Tibet would not "rise up and throw off the Communist Yoke." Secret Armies would not break China apart or bring down "the Peiping regime." It seemed a sad end for the undercover warriors of the CIA's "Department of Dirty Tricks."[89]

Yet the loss in Tibet helped create a victory in India, pushing Nehru from his earlier friendship with China toward what journalist Neville Maxwell called India's China War.[90]

Back in 1956 the Chinese had begun building a road from Sinkiang into Western Tibet, passing through Aksai Chin, a 17,000 foot high wasteland on the edge of the Ladakh ("Little Tibet") district of Kashmir. India and China both claimed Aksai Chin, and when Nehru learned of the Chinese road, he protested sharply to Peking.[91]

The revolt in Lhasa added fuel to the fire, especially when warring Tibetan tribesmen occupied wide stretches of the ill-defined frontier between India and Tibet. Chinese troops

pursued them, and in August, at Lonju near the McMahon Line in the Northeast, Chinese and Indian troops exchanged shots. War was waiting in the wings.[92]

On the question of borders, Nehru showed little willingness to compromise. The border was where he said it was, and that was that.[93] But for all the arrogance, Nehru remained calm over Tibet. When George Patterson had first sent out reports of the unrest around Lhasa, Nehru minimized the situation and threatened to bar the Scotsman from the border area. Nehru then offered sanctuary to the Dalai Lama, but forbade any government-in-exile on Indian soil, hoping to keep the question of Tibet low-key and out of the Cold War.[94]

But Nehru could no longer dictate India's foreign policy, and the force of events was clearly against moderation, as the New York Times predicted.

"The escape of the Dalai Lama may have relatively little effect on the course of revolt and its suppression in Tibet. It may, on the other hand, force a change in the general tone of Indian policy .... He [the Dalai Lama] becomes a symbol for resistance to communism. The Prime Minister is being forced into stronger positions than he had hitherto taken regarding Red China."[95]

The United States helped to build that "resistance," using foreign aid, public statements, and a highly-successful trip by President Eisenhower at the end of 1959.[96] But Washington also counted on a dazzling array of covert allies, an American *apparat* which ranged from refugee relief to the leading intellectuals of India and "the West."

Refugees Against China

Ever since the early hope of liberation in Eastern Europe, American leaders had developed a mix of public and private relief programs for anti-Communist refugees, and the Tibetans were no exception.[97] Washington furnished Food for Peace, which CARE, Church World Service and other private groups distributed. Officials set guidelines for the private groups through the State Department's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, while CIA agents and diplomatic officers on the spot gave advice.[98]

The purpose of the programs was mixed. Many Americans simply felt sorry for the homeless Tibetans; others saw them as valiant fighters for freedom and a reserve of guerrilla fighters; still others realized that something had to be done to keep the Tibetans from creating serious economic and law-and-order problems in India.[99] But whatever the motive, refugee aid made good anti-Communist publicity, and nowhere more than in India.

The most obviously political of the relief agencies was the American Emergency Committee for Tibetan Refugees (AER), headed by Lowell Thomas and Justice William Douglas. An outgrowth of earlier work with anti-Communist refugees in Hong Kong and Taiwan, AER also included veterans of the CIA's liberation movement in Europe and its highly successful use of refugees in South Vietnam.[100]

"Why did our people respond?", asked Chairman Thomas in a full-page ad in the New York Times. Because it was in "our tradition and national soul," and "not merely that the peace-loving Tibetan people are the latest victims of Chinese Communist imperialism."[101]

The propaganda was even more blatant when Thomas wrote on the "Terror in Tibet" for Reader's Digest. "What Buchenwald was to the 1940's, Tibet was to the 1950's," he declared.[102]

The goal was to scare India and the rest of Asia.

"The Chinese intend to subjugate all of Asia, a fact that is only too evident from the armed interference in Korea, Indo-China, and Burma, and from the subversive intervention throughout the area. India and the rest of the subcontinent, however, are the richest prizes in Asia," explained AER director, Lowell Thomas Jr. in his hastily published Silent War in Tibet.[103]

"The first step of the Chinese toward Asia's richest prize was to advance China's borders to the Indo-Tibetan frontier. From airfields in Tibet, Chinese bombers would be hardly more than one hour from Delhi. Next Tibet had to be made a powerful military base from which subversive and ultimately, if necessary, armed action against the subcontinent could be directed," Thomas concluded.[104]

The Tibetans agreed. Thubten Norbu had now come into his own, handling contacts with the relief agencies and part of the propaganda load.

"The Communist intention is to come to India and take India, and after taking India, take Asia, because once you have the key — Tibet — you can open the door in India, and then the door is open for Asia, too," the Buddhist leader asserted.

"Their desire is to get as much as they can of the world."[105]

It was an old story. Back in November 1950, when the Chinese first made their own liberation of Tibet, the New York Times had warned that Soviet survey teams had secretly "chosen sites for air bases in Western Tibet as part of a master plan to enable Moscow to extend its domination ultimately down through India and Pakistan to the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea."[106]

The author of the three-part series, correspondent Robert Trumbull, told in ominous detail how the Russian surveyors had hidden wireless sets and geiger counters in brass Buddhas, how they disguised themselves in a country which watches every strange face, and how they were preparing for Moscow to "take in the Ladakh Buddhist Province of Kashmir and initiate large-scale infiltration into India."[107]

The Times followed up with a short column on the changing fashions in espionage, an editorial and the news that Secretary of State Acheson found no reason to doubt Trumbull's story, while Trumbull admitted getting his scoop from "findings of anti-Communist intelligence activity." It was inspired journalism and the moral was good on any occasion: India and the Asian neutralists should seek American protection.[108]

Intellectuals Against China

Washington helped provide a more sophisticated approach through the Paris-based Congress for Cultural Freedom, a prestigious intellectual forum which had grown out of a June, 1950 conference in West Berlin. Liberal, social democratic, and ex-Communist intellectuals had come to the conference and proclaimed their opposition to the Communists, the old revolutionary ideologies, and the old utopian faiths. They were now "reasonable, sophisticated incrementalists, bored with yesterday's ideological bouts." They would fight for cultural freedom, not social revolution.[109]

"We are living in the last phase of an ebbing revolutionary epoch. [All could now see] the absurdity of the belief in perfect and logical social conditions," argued the one-time German Communist Franz Borkenau.[110]

"The alternative is no longer nationalization or private economy in the abstract. The real purpose is to find the proper balance of State ownership, control, planning, and free enterprise. And this is an empirical question," urged

novelist Arthur Koestler, one of the conference organizers.[111]

The CIA liked this sophisticated attack on communist ideas and agreed to provide funds for continuing activity through a series of "dummy" foundations. It also placed an agent on the CCF staff in Paris and another as editor of the key CCF publication Encounter.

"The agents could not only propose anti-Communist programs to the official leaders of the organizations but they could also suggest ways and means to solve the inevitable budgeting problems. Why not see if the money could be obtained from 'American foundations!?", explained former CIA executive Thomas Braden.[112]

The CIA used the CCF primarily in the Cold War in Europe. But CCF also sponsored a major conference in India in 1951, bringing American Socialist Norman Thomas and others to preach that non-alignment was immoral.

The Indian delegates didn't necessarily agree. Jayaprakash Narayan, who chaired the conference, argued that the anti-Communist crusade would not succeed in Asia unless accompanied by an effective attack on poverty. Then, when the Swiss writer Denis de Rougement compared Indian neutrality with the lamb who wouldn't chose between the wolf and the shepherd, Narayan replied that after chasing away the wolf the shepherd "shears the lamb and possibly eats it."[113]

But Narayan and the other veterans of the struggle for Indian independence did accept the anti-Communist and the attack on revolutionary idealism. This "end of ideology" fit well with the opposition to revolutionary class struggle which the Indian spiritual leader Mahatma Gandhi had preached. It also complemented the "non-ideological" economic development strategies urged by the more sophisticated American experts, themselves "reasonable, sophisticated incrementalists."[114]

"The West" had won a major battle on the cultural front. Narayan, who was widely regarded as a possible successor to Nehru, served as honorary co-chairman of the International Congress for Cultural Freedom; the economist Asoka Mehta spoke frequently at CCF events; the Bombay political leader and associate of the Tata industrial empire Minoo Masani took leadership in the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom. CCF also established an Asian Office in New Delhi, later created a China Study Centre, and helped support the magazine Quest.[115]

CCF naturally joined the fight against China. The Indian Committee published a collection on the Tibetan revolt edited by Nehru's brother-in-law,[116] while the International CCF brought out a new journal, The China Quarterly. The first issue featured coverage of Tibet by George Patterson. Subsequent issues carried further articles by Patterson, a review of his Tibet in Revolt by Robert Ekvall, and pro-Indian discussions of the border dispute.[117]

The sophisticated anti-Communism of the Congress for Cultural Freedom made its impact in Indian publishing, in the Congress Party, and even in Nehru's own family.[118] But it was particularly strong in the opposition Praja Socialist Party, which Narayan and Mehta led through the 1950's.

During the early years of the decade the Praja Socialists had done well at the polls and many observers saw them as "a third force" — a non-revolutionary alternative should the Congress Party fall into corruption as had the Chinese Nationalists. The Praja Socialists were moderate, had a reputation for reform, and favored — for "pragmatic" reasons, of course — a mixed form of capitalist development. Ambassador Bowles also noted that they were "often more aware of the World Communist danger than many of the more conservative Congress Party members."[119]

As a group, the Praja Socialists were big on Tibet, trying since November 1950 to paint the Chinese take-over as a threat to India.[120] They helped the Tibetan rebels publicize their 1958 Manifesto of Independence, worked closely with Lowell Thomas and the American Emergency Relief, and helped organize an All-India Tibet Convention.[121]

Narayan also presided over an 18-nation Afro-Asian Conference on Tibet in April 1960, during the week following a last-minute peace-mission to New Delhi by Chou En-lai. The conference condemned China for genocide, and the Praja Socialists went on to beat the drums of war.[122]

"In Tibet we see at this moment the workings of a new imperialism which is far more dangerous than the old because it marches under the banner of a so-called revolutionary ideology," proclaimed Narayan.[123]

The ideas of the Congress for Cultural Freedom also found an outlet on the non-Socialist side of the political spectrum, in the pro-private enterprise Swantantra ("Freedom") Party. Cultural Freedom leader Minoo Masani, the general secretary, helped bring the new party together in the months following the flight of the Dalai Lama, and in the Parliament he joined with Asoka Mehta in the effort to beat Nehru with Tibet. Swantantra also helped sponsor anti-Chinese demonstrations and the 1960 Afro-Asian Conference on Tibet.[124]

The logic of the Opposition was simple. They attacked Nehru in his once-private domain of foreign policy, pushing him toward *de facto* alliance with the United States and Britain. But their attacks and demands that he resign weakened Nehru domestically, pushed Indian policy toward the right on economic and social policy, and helped isolate India's Communists, against whom both PSP and Swatantra had to compete at the polls.[125]

"It is a reasonable view," explained author Girilal Jain, "that the struggle against the Communist Party at home and defense against aggression by China have to be conceived and organized as parts of one over-all plan."[126]

Yet the risks were enormous; in the end the defenders of Cultural Freedom helped push Nehru into a war with China.

"To defend your own territory is not to wage war," Masani declared late in 1959. "I have never known the suggestion before that if you throw out bandits from your territory you are engaged in an act of war. It is just police action on your own territory."[127]

"The threat can and must be used to achieve national cohesion and spur national endeavor," urged Mehta.

"Confronted by aggressive footsteps along our traditional ramparts the nation will be willing to bear additional sacrifices."[128]

Family Planners Against China

Washington had its allies in many places, even among Indian population control experts like Dr. Sripati Chandrasekhar.

A one-time student in the United States and a specialist in Indian demography for the Office of Strategic Services, Chandrasekhar had returned home to create the Indian Institute for Population Studies and the scholarly Population Review. Money for these efforts was hard to come by, and Chandrasekhar accepted occasional grants from the CIA's Asia Foundation and the Granary Fund of Boston, a frequent conduit for CIA money.[129] He also accepted a paid invitation from the CIA-subsidized World Assembly of Youth

to serve as co-chairman of its December, 1963 seminar on Asian Population Problems.[130]

Chandrasekhar claims that he did not know the source of the funding,[131] and in fact he would have had great difficulty distinguishing the "tainted money" from those grants he received from the Milbank or Hugh Moore Funds. Trustees of the CIA foundations were generally among those wealthy and worldly people most likely to give their own time and money to population control — like Samuel Robbins Milbank, who was also a trustee of the Asia Foundation, or Cass Canfield, chairman of International Planned Parenthood and also trustee of the Fairfield Foundation, which channeled money to the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Straight or undercover, those who supported Chandrasekhar were buying the same thing — demography and the chance to advance the career of a man who would become head of India's massive population control effort.[132]

But on one occasion the CIA got something more for its money. In November 1958, the State of Madras sent Chandrasekhar for two months "to study China's population problems and policies." The Granary Fund then brought him to Hong Kong; the Asia Foundation paid for publication of two lectures on China's Population; and Averell Harriman offered another grant from the Granary Fund for Chandrasekhar to speak at universities throughout Africa and the Middle East.[133]

In return, Chandrasekhar provided China-watchers with first hand observations and lent his prolific pen, scientific credentials, and Asian face to a blistering attack on "Chinese aggression."

In several articles and in Red China: An Asia View Chandrasekhar championed the Tibetans, "who wanted to preserve their own free way of life. He categorically denied China's "strange, non-existent sovereignty," defended Tibet's claims to independence, and reprinted in full the first speech in India of the Dalai Lama.

"It is true that Tibet is economically and socially a backward country, and more theocratic than secular," Chandrasekhar admitted.

"But every country should have the right to lead and preserve her way of life, no matter how obscurantist it may appear to others, so long as she be peaceful and does not encroach upon the rights of others."[134]

It was a ringing defense of self-determination, but Chandrasekhar didn't stop there. China's "rape of Tibet" was the start of Chinese aggression against India and all of Asia, while Communism was simply "another and more sinister imperialism."[135]

As a demographer, Chandrasekhar was particularly concerned about China's "enormous" population growth. "Communist ideology and population pressure are an alarming combination," he warned. "The thought of a strong, industrialized, militarized China, with her millions goose-stepping across the frontiers, is a frightening one."[136]

India was in danger and Chandrasekhar saw only one way out. Indian leaders should no longer back China's admission into the United Nation and recognize the "compelling and immediate need for revising India's policy of neutrality and entering into new alliances."[137]

Jurists Against China

Washington's most important ally was the least known — Purshottam Trikamdas, Senior Advocate of the Indian Supreme Court, a former leader of the Praja Socialists, and spokesman for the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists. In June 1959 Trikamdas accused China of *systematically* killing, jailing, and deporting the Tibetans. The International Commission of Jurists then appointed Trikamdas to evaluate the charge with a panel of mostly Asian judges. The panel interviewed the Dalai Lama and the refugees, studied the available documents, and issued a verdict. Tibet had been "at the very least a *de facto* independent state." China had committed genocide.[138]

The verdict contradicted a lot of legal scholarship on the historical status of Tibet, ignored all evidence of American and Chinese Nationalist involvement, and consistently exaggerated China's response to the Tibetan uprising. Yet everyone from Jayaprakash Narayan to the New York Times took the verdict as an impartial judgement of China's guilt. After all, the International Commission of Jurists was hardly an organ of propaganda.[139]

Or was it?

Ten years earlier American intelligence officials in West Berlin had funded a prominent refugee lawyer from East Germany, Dr. Theo Friedenau, and his Investigating Committee of Free Jurists. The Committee provided legal advice to anti-Communist refugees, maintained contact with thousands of "secret cooperators" in East Germany, and compiled dossiers on Communist officials.[140]

"Dr. Friedenau's basic idea is simple," explained the sympathetic John Lineham in American Mercury.

"This slim, dapper, forty-two year-old lawyer believes the Soviets want most to avoid advertisement of the fact that they must break their own laws in order to carry through with their various 'democratic reforms.' "[141]

The jurists advertised these legal violations in leaflets, by word-of-mouth, and over Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), and even sent letters to the law-breakers warning that they would be held individually responsible for their crimes, according to the principle established at the Nuremberg Trials. West German courts recognized the Committee's testimony as "semi-official," and authorities actually brought cases against violators who later sought sanctuary in West Germany.[142]

But advertising was only part of what the Investigating Committee of Free Jurists did. They also provided information and recruited agents for the Americans, and particularly for the special CIA unit headed by the former chief of Hitler's anti-Russian intelligence service, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen.[143]

The Jurists and their recruits were particularly useful in scientific and industrial espionage, and played an important role in the June 1953 uprising in East Germany. They also helped create a group of East German university graduates trained to ferret out information and defectors at international congresses and scientific meetings in the neighboring Soviet-bloc countries.[144]

The Soviets reacted sharply. They infiltrated the Committee, arrested several of its "secret cooperators," and kidnapped two key Jurists — the economic expert Dr. Walter Linse in July 1952 and Dr. Erwin Neumann in 1957.[145] Still, the Investigating Committee for Free Jurists continued as a mainstay of the American propaganda effort in Germany and in the 1960's sent one of its leaders, Dr. Gunther Nollau, into the upper echelons of the West German intelligence service.[146]

The Jurists and their backers decided quite early to spread their "basic idea," and only days after the kidnapping of Dr. Linse, Dr. Friedenau welcomed nearly 150 delegates from 42 countries to a 7-day conference in West Berlin. The lawyers

and judges in attendance studied the Committee's evidence against East Germany, condemned the administration of justice there as virtual tyranny, and resolved to create a new international body to seek out and publicize evidence of legal abuses throughout the Soviet Bloc.[147] This became the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), headed by Judge Joseph Thorson of Canada, Dr. Friedenau, and other legal leaders of the Free World. Less exalted but no less important, the administrative secretary of the ICJ was a veteran of the CIA's Radio Free Europe.[148]

To finance and help guide the new group, several American lawyers then organized the American Fund for Free Jurists. Most of these lawyers had served in the American Occupation of Germany or in the intelligence community, and they put their experience to work.[149] Between 1958 and 1964 they channeled $650,000 from the CIA to the International Commission of Jurists, according to the New York Times. The total CIA contribution was apparently higher, but the Times' figure is enough to throw considerable doubt on the impartiality of Purshottam Trikamdas and his investigation of Tibet.[150]

Tibetans Against China

The young Dalai Lama fleeing bravely to freedom, tattered refugees without a home — the Tibetans were appealing underdogs. But neither the drama nor a belief in self-determination, nor even the general climate of anti-Communism, were enough to cast the Chinese as aggressive imperialists, waiting only for the right moment before sweeping downhill into India and beyond. Images like that did not grow out of the thin Himalayan air. Like the tribesmen trained in Colorado, they were planted.

To the needy Tibetans, of course, all help was welcome. Only later did they learn the rules of power politics, or realize that Washington had worked only through private agencies and the CIA, never committing itself officially to Tibetan independence. The Cold War with China closed and the Americans simply pulled back from their Tibetan "friends."

The Indians also pulled back. They officially conceded Peking the right to determine how much "autonomy" Tibet should have, dropped the term "refugee" in reference to the 100,000 Tibetans now in India, and in March, 1973 suppressed the Dalai Lama's annual speech in commemoration of the uprising in Lhasa.[151]

Still, the Tibetans are not without hope, especially the new generation of Tibetan students in exile. According to the ever-present George Patterson, the new militants want to make "Tibet — China's Vietnam," and this time they want help from the Soviet Union.[152]

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FOOTNOTES

1. "U.S. Said To Delay Film About Tibet," *New York Times*, December 26, 1971, 21:1.
2. Lt. Col. Ilia Tolstoy, "Across Tibet From India to China," *National Geographic*, August 1946, 169-222.
3. "Whereas the actual extent of Chinese control in Tibet varied markedly over the years, depending on the stability of the Central Government, its military power and other political factors, domestic as well as foreign, the thesis has generally been upheld that, in spite of all temporary fluctuations, *de jure* the status of Tibet was that of a component of the Chinese State, quasi-independent internally, but subject to Chinese suzerainty and represented by Peking in all matters of international diplomacy." George Ginsburgs and Michael Mathos, *Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1964), 4. See also Harry S. Bradsher, "Tibet Struggles to Survive," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1969, 753; Tieh-Tseng Li, *Tibet Today and Yesterday* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1960); and Hugh E. Richardson, *A Short History of Tibet* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1962) 28-168. Richardson, the last British Representative in Tibet, argues that Tibet was in fact independent.
4. R[ichard] Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 254-55; Richardson, 159-64; U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), *1942, China*, 603, 624-31, 687-93; *1943, China*, 620-37; *1944, China*, 960-63, 969-70, 976-77.
5. Tieh-Tseng Li, 188-90; *FRUS, 1943, China*, 636-37, 641-42.
6. *FRUS, 1943, China*, 630. This is from an Aide-Memoir to the British Embassy, and something less than a wholesale endorsement of China's claims. The British would not regard China as the suzerain unless she would agree to Tibetan autonomy (and some British influence), but did not want to create trouble with the Chinese, who were wartime allies. Washington agreed that it was better to put off the question, and avoid choosing between two allies. Nonetheless, it was true that Washington had never questioned China's claims, and that implied a tacit acceptance. For the British position, see *FRUS, 1942, China*, 144-45; *1943, China*, 634-38.
7. Ibid., 623-26, 629; Smith, 254-55.
8. Lt. Col. William Boyd Sinclair, *Jump to the Land of God: The Adventures of a United States Air Force Crew in Tibet* (Caldwell, Idaho: The Caxton Printers, 1965).
9. Two of the Westerners permitted to visit Lhasa were Arch Steele of the Chicago Daily News and Amaury de Reincourt, authof of *Roof of the World: Tibet, Key to Asia* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1950).
10. Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 295-97; Tieh-Tseng Li, 197-98; The mission also visited Nanking, China.
11. Shakabpa, 297-98; Tieh-Tseng Li, 198-99; Richardson, 177-78.
12. Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (New York: Random House, 1970), 68-69. Heinrich Harrer, *Seven Years in Tibet* (London: Rupert Hart Davis, 1953), 197-8; Lowell Thomas Jr., *Out Of This World* (New York: Grestone Press, 1950), 284-8; Robert Ford, *Wind Between The Worlds* (New York: David McKay, 1957), 268-9. Ford, one of the two Englishmen who helped the Tibetans with communications, was an ex-Royal Air Force radio man. The other Englishman was Reginald Fox, the former radio operator at the British legation in Lhasa. Ford was captured by the Chinese and confessed to spying, but later claimed that his confession was false. He also challenged the description of his radio work in Thomas and Harrer.
13. Shakabpa, 298; Harrer, 196-7; Thomas, 13-17, 29-34, 46, 177-8.
14. Thomas 16-17, 55, 236-241, 310-11. "The most important requirement, of course, is skillful guerrilla forces. To create these, Tibet needs arms and advice principally from outside. Arms would include weapons especially adapted to guerrilla warfare, such as Garand rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenades and mines. The kind of advice needed is technical instruction in the proper use and maintenance of this modern equipment, and in the most advanced methods of guerrilla strategy." (240). See also the *New York Times* for 1949, October 11, 21:1; 17, 25:7; 25.

15. Thomas, 32, 239.
16. Thomas, 32; George N. Patterson, Tragic Destiny (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), 33-34. Cf. "Soviet Sees A Plot in Thomas Trip," *New York Times*, December 24, 1949, 16:3.
17. "Tibet Could Have Been Saved," *Christian Century*, November 15, 1950, 1348.
18. "U.S. May Grant Tibet Recognition in View of Current Asian Situation," *New York Times*, October 25, 1949, 5:2.
19. "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," NSC 48/1, December 23, 1949 and NSC 48/2, December 30, 1949, in 92nd Cong., 1st sess., House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, *United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-67* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971), VIII, 241, 271. NSC 48/2 adds; "The United States should continue the policy set forth in NSC 37/2 and 37/5 of attempting to deny Formosa and the Pescadores to the Chinese Communists through diplomatic and economic means." It also reaffirms the strategic importance of Formosa, but declares that the strategic importance "does not justify overt military action . . . so long as the present disparity between our military strength and our global obligations exists."
20. Thomas, 241. In the November 11, 1950 *New Yorker*, 84-85, journalist Richard Rovere described an Armed Forces Training Talk No. 348 on Tibet, which showed little knowledge of the country, its people, or its exact borders. Rovere concluded that the American military found Tibet "incomparably the world's least desirable military base," so worthless that no G.I. needed to worry about being sent there. There were also at the time rumors in India of a "top secret military briefing for American troops on Tibet." It is unclear whether this was an exaggeration of the Training Talk described by Rovere or a very different document. See George N. Patterson, *Peking vs. Delhi* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 156.
21. A.B. Shaw, "Indian Foreign Policy — A Reply," in Shaw ed., *India's Defense and Foreign Policies* (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1966), 87. In 1966 Shaw was Executive Secretary of the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom.
22. *Department of State Bulletin*, January 16, 1950, 79.
23. *Tragic Destiny*, 13-16, 204-10. Patterson repeats parts of his story in several other books: *Tibetan Journey* (London: Faber and Faber, 1954), an American version *Journey With Loshay* (New York: Norton, 1954) and *Tibet in Revolt* (London: Faber and Faber, 1960). Though Sikang was directly ruled by the Chinese, the Tibetans thought of roughly the same region as Kham, and most observers considered part of East Tibet or Ethnographic Tibet. Patterson claims that there were 39 major tribes in Kham. *Peking vs. Delhi*, 95. The other part of East Tibet is Amdo, or as the Chinese call it, Tsinghai Province.
24. *Tragic Destiny*, 17-23, 207-209. The Khamba leaders were Ragpa and Topgay Pangdatshang, the Amdowas Geshi Sherab Gyaltso and Lobsang Tsewong, who was also known as Abu Abolok and Hou wan Seiling. For background, see *Tibet in Revolt*, 52-59.
25. *Tragic Destiny*, 23, 30-35, 42-43. The American Vice-Consul at Urumchi, Sinkiang had just fled to Northern Tibet, along with the scholar Frank Bessac, two White Russians and others. Tibetan border guards accidentally killed the Vice-Consul and wounded some of the others, and Ambassador Henderson asked Patterson to lead an expedition into Tibet to rescue the survivors. But Tibetan officials brought the group to the Indian-Tibetan border, hoping to avoid arrousing any further Chinese suspicion.
26. *Tragic Destiny*, 59-64, 116-20, 130-34. Patterson's fellow-missionary Geoffrey Bull was captured by the Chinese and held prisoner until late 1953. Chinese documents on the "liberation" are in Ling Nai-min ed., *Tibet 1950-1967* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), 1-23. "Professor George Taylor and other scholars of the University of Washington in Seattle gave invaluable assistance for the finalization of the original edition," according to the Preface. The Union Research Institute, heavily funded by the CIA's Asia Foundation, was for years one of the major China-watching posts in Hong Kong.
27. *Tragic Destiny*, 78-84; Thubten Jigme Norbu with Heinrich Harrer, *Tibet Is My Country* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1961), 244. Norbu's full name is Thubten Jigme Norbu Takster Rimpoche; Patterson and the *New York Times* call him Takster Rimpoche. Harrer is an Austrian who fled to Tibet from a British P.O.W. camp in India and then stayed in Lhasa as "Master of Electricity."
28. *Tragic Destiny*, 84.
29. Norbu, 240-42; Richardson, 275-278; Ngawang Lobsang, the Dalai Lama of Tibet, *My Land and My People* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), 81-89. "Invasion Menace Stirs Tibet Action," *New York Times*, March 9, 1950, 17:4, "China Food Airlift Accepted by Tibet," *New York Times*, November 8, 1951, 3:1; and "Flight of the Dalai Lama," *Life*, April 23, 1951, 130-40. The photos were by Harrer, who accompanied the Dalai Lama to Yatung. See also Arthur Mathers, "Threat to 'The Land in the Sky,' " *New York Times* Magazine, November 8, 1950, 15.
30. *Tragic Destiny*, 85, 88-89; *Tibet in Revolt*, 81-82; The Dalai Lama, 89-90; and "Dalai Lama Said to Study Peiping Pact Repudiation," *New York Times*, July 18, 1951, 4:3.
31. William O. Douglas, *Strange Lands and Friendly People* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1951); *Beyond the High Himalayas* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1953); *North From Malaya* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1953). The quotation is from Louis Fisher, "He Went Among the Plain People," *New York Times Book Review*, November 4, 1951, 1, 43.
    The International Mass Education Movement and the Institute for Rural Reconstruction in the Philippines continued the work of Dr. Y.C. "Jimmy" Yen in China. The CIA's Asia Foundation gave occasional grants to the ostensibly non-governmental work, and it is likely that Washington's covert involvement went much deeper. The Philippine Institute worked with a counterpart Philippine Movement for Rural Reconstruction, the success of which "caused the Philippine Government to establish a special agency for a national Community Development Program," explained Douglas [in *Towards a Global Federalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1968), 126-27]. Douglas now heads the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, which works with national movements in Thailand, Korea and Ceylon, and with the Afro-Asian Rural Reconstruction Organization based in New Delhi. Douglas was also on the board of the CIA-aided Inter-American Center of Economic and Social Studies in the Dominican Republic in 1962. "Education Unit Aims to Aid South Asians," *New York Times*, July 13, 1951, 12:6; "Philippine Village Award to Foundation," *Asia Foundation Program Bulletin*, March 1966, 8; "Rural Reconstruction Movement," *Asia Foundation Program Bulletin*.
    "Recent Foundation Grants," entry on "Thailand — Foundation for Thailand Rural Reconstruction Movement," *Asia Foundation Program Bulletin*, September, 1970, 11. Harry Bayard Price ed., *Rural*

Reconstruction and Development: A Manual for Field Workers (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967) and the journal *Rural Reconstruction*, put out by the Afro-Asian Rural Reconstruction Organization. See also "Thomas Upholds CIA-Aided Work," *New York Times*, February 22, 1967, 17; and Robert Scheer, *How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam* (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1965), 13-16, reprinted in Marvin E. Gettleman ed. *Viet Nam* (New York: Fawcett, 1965), 237. According to Scheer, "Douglas told the author that he arranged a breakfast meeting at which he introduced Diem to Senator Mike Mansfield and John F. Kennedy." Douglas discusses Diem in *North From Malaya*, 80-81, 204.

32. Thomas, 13.
33. *Beyond the High Himalayas*, 9, 46-7, 208. Douglas's trip is noted in the *New York Times* for 1951, April 1, 43:2; July 2, 2:8; July 3, 20:3; July 24, 10:5; August 18, 13:4; August 20, 4:1; August 21, 6:5. Douglas's companion in the Himalayas, and his later protege, was Ram N. Rahul, now a well-known Indian expert on Central Asia and author of *The Himalayan Borderland* (Delhi: 1970).
    See "Lofty Peaks Lure Asian at Columbia," *New York Times*, November 15, 1953, 118:3.
34. *Beyond the High Himalayas*, 208.
35. *Ibid.*, 209.
36. *Ibid.* 217-218; *North From Malaya*, 278-87; "Douglas: A Different Kind of Judge," *U.S. News & World Report*, September 14, 1951, 50-55; "Douglas Admonishes U.S.," *New York Times*, February 15, 1951, 5:2; "Truman Silent on Douglas Talk," *New York Times*, February 16, 1951, 17:4; "Recognize Peking, Justice Urges U.S.," *New York Times*, September 1, 1951, 1:5; "Aid to Foe Charged to Justice Douglas," *New York Times*, September 3, 1951, 8:7. See also "Justice Douglas Asks U.N. Seat 2 Chinas," *New York Times*, January 31, 1955, 1:8.
37. "Douglas: A Different Kind of Judge," *U.S. News & World Report*, September 14, 1951, 50-55; *Beyond the High Himalayas*, 217-18.
38. Fisher, 1,43; Charles Poore, "Books of the Times," *New York Times*, November 1, 1951, 27:2; Douglas, "Revolution Is Our Business," *The Nation*, May 31, 1952, 516-19." For a critique of Douglas's "Revolution," see I.F. Stone, *The Truman Era* (New York: Random House, 1972), 220-22.
39. *Beyond the High Himalayas*, 213-16.
40. Douglas, 96-97, 210, *Tragic Destiny*, 87-90.
41. *Tragic Destiny*, 84-86, 90; Norbu, 242-45; Steve Weissman and John Shoch, "CIAsia Foundation," *Pacific Research*, September-October 1972, 3-4. Norbu claimed that he had made contact with the CIA Committee through a Tibetan friend at Johns Hopkins University, Telopa Rimpoche, who had gotten to Hopkins "through the mediation of an American businessman in Hong Kong named Robert Drummond." See also "Brother of Dalai Lama Arrives Here to Study," *New York Times*, July 9, 1951, 8:3; and "Dalai Lama's Brother Expresses His Dislike of Chinese Communists," *New York Times*, August 2, 1951, 4:3.
42. Norbu 245-46; Robert B. Ekvall, *Fields on the Hoof: Nexus of Tibetan Nomadic Pastoralism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), v-x; *Faithful Echo* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960), 21-23, 28-30, 49-50, 86; *Contemporary Authors*, Vol. 1-4, First Revision, 928. Pattersons claimed that he recommended Ekvall to the Americans. *Tragic Destiny*, 85.
43. Norbu, 246-256; *Tragic Destiny*, 93, 98, 101-2, 107. The brother was Gyalo Thondup. See also the *New York Times* for May 23, 1950, 1:4; and September 16, 1951, 2:3.
44. The Committee became the Asia Foundation in 1954, and in that same year it joined with the Ford Foundation to help U Nu of Burma create the International Institute for Advance Buddhist Studies in Rangoon, a center for all Southeast Asia Buddhists. The Foundation also worked with village monks on community development projects and with various organized Buddhist associations. See, for example, "Service of the Poor is Service of the Buddha," *Asia Foundation Program Bulletin* June 1959, 4-5; " 'Life of Buddha' Publication," *Asia Foundation Program Bulletin*, September 1960, 7; "Teaching Aids for Pali Schools in Thailand," *Asia Foundation Program Bulletin*, March 1961, 4; Jerald Schecter, *The New Face of Buddha: Buddhism and Political Power in Southeast Asia* (New York: Coward McCann, 1967); and Weissman and Shoch, 3-4.
45. Norbu, 247, 257-8. See also Thubten Jigme Norbu and Colin M. Turnbull, *Tibet* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968). Norbu went on to teach at the University of Indiana. Ekvall, *Fields on the Hoof*, vi; "A Seminar on Tibetan Society and Culture," *Current Anthropology*, October 1963, 68-70; "The Nomadic Pattern of Living Among the Tibetans As Preparation for War," *American Anthropologist*, December 1961, 1250-63; *Religious Observances in Tibet: Patterns and Functions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); and C.W. Cassinelli and Robert B. Ekvall, *A Tibetan Principality: The Political System of SaSKym* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). Moss Roberts noted that the Asia Foundation gave the Far EAstern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington $40,000 during George Taylor's tenure as director. "Some Problems Concerning the Structure and Direction of Contemporary China Studies — A Reply to Professor Fairbank," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Summer-Fall 1971, 121. Shakabpa, "Foreword," by Turrell Wylie, Associate Professor of Tibetan Language and Civilization, University of Washington.
46. *Tragic Destiny*, 91.
47. "The Soviet government of China recognizes the right of self-determination of the national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China, and to the formation of an independent state for each national minority. All Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans, and others living on the territory of China shall enjoy the full right to self-determination, i.e. they may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer." From the "Constitution of the [Chinese] Soviet Republic," November 7, 1931, reprinted in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1959), 223. The promise of the right to complete separation seems to have eroded by 1944, when Mao Tse-tung talked to British correspondent Guenther Stein. See U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United, 1944, China*, 537.
48. In Hyderabad in 1948, Nehru had sent in the Army to force the princely state into the Indian Union. In Nepal, he supported the King against the long rule of a competing clan. In Sikkim he sent troops to back the traditional ruler against a small rebellion. In Bhutan he signed a treaty giving India control over foreign policy. Maxwell, 67-8, 176-7; and Alastair Lamb, *Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 111-45 ("There are great problems to be faced in an attempt to seek out a definition of the term 'India' which antedates the British Raj.").
49. Some 400,000 Nagas live in the heavily jungled foothills of the Himalayas. They are ethnically closer to the Tibetans than to the Hindi-speaking Aryans of the Indian plains, and a majority of them practice

Christianity, a legacy of the British and other missionaries. Naga leaders have demanded independence since the 1920's, and when India included them in the North East Frontier Agency, they appealed to the United Nations and set up their own parallel government. By 1956 Naga guerrillas had started attacking Indian posts. The Indians retaliated, and Naga spokesman A.Z. Phizo asked aid and recognition from the West. The conflict continued into the 1960's, when the Nagas began seeking help from China. The Mizo people began a similar rebellion in the 1960's. Lamb, 115-6; Bernard D. Nossiter, *Soft State: A Newspaperman's Chronicle of India* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 145-56; Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 42-48, 208-209. See also D.R. Mankekar, *On the Slippery Slope in Nagaland* (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1967) and Verrier Elwin, *Nagaland* (Calcutta: Shillong, 1961).

50. ". . . the first and almost instinctive reaction of every new government was to hold fast to the territory bequethed to it. What the colonial power had ruled, the new state must rule." Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (New York: Pantheon, 1968), 185. "China is, in practice, a colonial power, even though its subject peoples are on the Asian continent rather than overseas, and the relations between the Han majority, of Chinese language and culture, and the minority non-Han peoples have been a recurrent problem throughout its history. China now has over 35 million people of minority races, classified into more than 50 groups; although they constitute only 6 percent of China's population, they occupy over half of its territory." A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy*, for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), 27. See also 77-78, 81-82, 108-109; Clifford Geertz, "The Social-Cultural Context of Policy in Southeast Asia," in William Henderson, ed., *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1963), 45; Ling Nai-min.
51. Thomas, 218; cf. Richardson, 14-18.
52. The Dalai Lama, 61.
53. Norbu, 218.
54. "East-West Struggle in the Himalayas," *New York Times*, February 21, 1955, 20:5." C.L. Sulzberger, the author of the observation, was far from pleased by the mild treatment. Tibet, he warned, was becoming "a political showcase in the Himalayan region." Ginsburgs and Mathos, 40-116; Ling Nai-min. For a pro-Chinese account of the first years, see Alan Winnington, *Tibet: Record of a Journey* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1957).
55. Ling Nai-min.
56. Barnett, 27-28, 92-95; De Riencourt, 236, 304-305.
57. Robert T. Holt, *Radio Free Europe* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958); Alan E. Michie, *Voices Through the Iron Curtain: The Radio Free Europe Story* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1963); "Support of Radio by CIA May End," *New York Times*, May 3, 1971, C11; "Embattled Radio Free Europe Defends Role," *New York Times*, March 15, 1971, 10; "US Foreign Radio Plan," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 1971, 12; E.H. Cookridge, *Gehlen: Spy of the Century* (New York: Random House, 1971), 142-263; Louis Hagen, *The Secret War in Europe* (New York: Stein and Day, 1969), 21-175; Kim Philby, *My Silent War* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), 194. One of the key organizations in the CIA's campaign against Russia was known variously as The American Committee for Freedom of the Peoples of the USSR, the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, the American Committee for Liberation, and the Radio Liberty Committee.
58. Weissman and Shoch, 3-4; George V.H. Mosely, III, *The Consolidation of the South China Frontier* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 34-35. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York: Bantam Books, 1964), 112-16, 138-144; Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday), 300; Stewart Alsop, "How We Drifted Close to War: The Story Behind Quemoy," *Saturday Evening Post*, December 13, 1958, 86-87; "Agent Freed by Chinese Arrives Home," *Los Angeles Times*, March 13, 1973, 10:1, "CIA's Downey Says He Revealed Data to Chinese During Grillings," *Los Angeles Times*, March 14, 1973, Pt. I, 20:1; Downey's Odyssey, *Newsweek*, March 26, 1973. See also Allen S. Whiting, "What Nixon Must Do To Make Friends in Peking," *New York Review of Books*, October 7, 1971.
59. An excellent account of Air America can be found in Peter Dale Scott, *The War Conspiracy: The Secret Road to the Second Indochina War* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), 193-97. According to Scott, in 1951 the CIA created Airdale, Inc., a Deleware-based holding company, which owned Civil Air Transport, Inc. CAT, Inc. supplied pilots to Civil Air Transport Co., Ltd., or CATCL, a Taiwan airline originally created by General Claire Chennault of the World War II "Flying Tigers." Ownership of CATCL was divided: 40% to the CIA's holding company Airdale, Inc.; 60% to the Nationalist Chinese. Finally, Airdale's wholely-owned CAT, Inc. had a subsidiary Asiatic Aeronautical Co., which provided aircraft and "one of the world's largest aircraft maintenance and repair facilities at Tainan in Southern Taiwan." CAT, Inc. became *Air America* after March 31, 1959; the subsidiary Asiatic Aeronautical became *Air Asia*; and the Airdale holding company became Pacific, Inc. Gen. Lansdale, a veteran of CIA operations in the Philippines and Vietnam, lumps all the operations together: "CAT, a CIA proprietary, provides air logistical support under commercial cover to most CIA and other U.S. Government agencies' requirements. CAT supports covert and clandestine air operations by providing trained and experienced personnel, procurement of supplies and equipment through commercial channels, and the maintenance of a fairly large inventory of transport and other type aircraft under both China [Chinese Nationalist] and U.S. registry." New York Times, *The Pentagon Papers*, ed. by Neil Sheehan *et. al.* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 137.
60. This view of promoting "disintegration from within" is from Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under John Foster Dulles. Testifying before a Congressional committee in early 1954, Robertson was asked if "the heart of present policy toward China and Formosa is that there is to be kept alive a constant threat of military action vis-a-vis Red China in the hope that at some point there will be an internal breakdown?" Robertson answered "yes," and many observers took that answer as a sign that the United States was considering open war against China. But, in June, Dulles denied any desire for general war, and the following year Robertson returned to the committee to clarify his position: "Our hope of solving the problem of the mainland of China was not through attack upon the mainland but rather by actions which would promote disintegration from within." 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., House of Representatives Subcommittee on Appropriations, *Hearings: Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, Appropriations for 1955*, January 26-February 3, 1954 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1954), 125; *Department of State Bulletin*, June 28, 1954, 973; 84th Cong., Ist sess., House of Representatives Subcommittee on Appropriations, *Hearings: Department of State and*

a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York: Random House, 1969), 322-359.

110. Lasch, 195.
111. *Ibid.*
112. Thomas W. Braden, "I'm Glad the CIA is 'Immoral,'" *Saturday Evening Post,* May 20, 1967. A veteran of the OSS, Braden served from 1950 to 1954 as assistant to Allen Dulles, deputy director and then director of the Agency.
113. Lasch, 202; *New York Times:* "Grain-for-India Bill To Be Filed Quickly," February 5, 1951, 10:2; "Indian Leaders Plan Anti-Red Conference," February 26, 1951; "Norman Thomas India-Bound," March 17, 1951, 13:1; "India Forces Moving of Anti-Red Parley," March 21, 1951, 2:2; "India Parley Links Food and Freedom," March 29, 1951, 12:1; "India Cultural Rally Hits Totalitarianism," April 1, 1951, 3:2; "India Body Backs Slave Labor Study," March 31, 1951, 3:2.
114. *Ibid.;* Bowles, *Ambassador's Journal,* 141; *The New Dimensions of Peace,* 147-48; Erik H. Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969); Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 370-78. On the Western economists, see Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Walt W. Rostow and Max Millikan, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harpers, 1957). Cf. Steve Weissman, "The Many 'Successes' of the Alliance for Progress," *Pacific Research* November, 1970.
115. Narayan had joined the Communist Party while studying in the United States during the Depression, and then returned to India where he decided the Party was a stumbling block to Independence. He quit, joined with Mehta to form a Socialist group within Congress, and became a hero of the Quit India Movement. But he remained bitter. "We were badly burned," he recalled. Asoka Mehta, an economist, was a leader of the India Labor Association (Hind Mazdoor Sabha) and the anti-Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Masani was a sometimes employee of the Tata family's industrial enterprises, a leader of the Forum for Free Enterprise, and also head of an anti-Communist propaganda organization, the Democratic Research Service. Bowles, *Ambassador's Journal,* 64, 116, 190-93; Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 97-101. Asoka Mehta, "Democracy in the New Nations," *Dissent,* Summer, 1960, 271-278, contains part of Mehta's talk to the 1958 Congress of Cultural Freedom Conference on the Isle of Rhodes, "An International Seminar: Representative Government and Public Liberties in the New States." For more on the Rhodes seminar, see Richard Rovere, "A Reporter at Large," *New Yorker,* November 8, 1958, 170. See also N. Pattabhi Raman, "Political Involvement in India's Trade Unions," (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967).
116. Gunottam Purushottam Hutheesing, *Tibet Fights for Freedom,* for the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom (Bombay: Orient-Longmans, 1960). Raja Hutheesing, as he is generally known, is the husband of Nehru's sister Krishna. See Krishna Nehru Hutheesing, *We Nehrus,* with Alden Hatch (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), 110-16.
117. George N. Patterson, "China and Tibet: Background to the Revolt," *The China Quarterly,* January-March 1960, 87; George N. Patterson, "The Situation in Tibet," April-June 1961, 81-86; and "Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and Toward the Himalayan Border States," October-December 1962, 191-201. Robert Ekvall, "Book Reviews," October-December 1960, 123-126; L. C. Green, "Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute," July-September 1960, 42-56, and a short note by Hugh E. Richardson in the issue for January-March, 1961.
118. Gunottam Purushottam Hutheesing, *Ibid.* and *The Great Peace: An Asian's Candid Report on Red China* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953); Krishna Nehru Hutheesing, *We Nehrus,* 269-78; Maxwell, 113-15; "Asians Indignant at Reds in Tibet," *New York Times,* April 1, 1959; Frank Moraes, *The Revolt in Tibet* (New York: MacMillan, 1960). See also "Cooperation with International Organizations," *Asia Foundation Program Bulletin,* June 1959, 6. Under the entry for International Press Institute, the Foundation announced that it was helping the IPI to expand its activities in Asia, arranging for a visit to Asia by two IPI officials and assisting delegates to the Institute's assemblies. Much of this new 'press offensive' was aimed at India, and some CIA funding went to the Press Institute of India. See John A. Lent, ed., *The Asian Newspapers' Reluctant Revolution* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1971), x, 3, 11, 185; *New York Times,* March 21, 11:1.
119. The PSP was not actually organized until after the 1952 elections as a merger of two earlier split-offs of the majority Congress Party — the Socialist Party of India and the Gandhian Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party. Bowles, *Ambassador's Report,* 69, 108, 116-17, 123, 147-54, 190-93; Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 25-40; A.H. Hanson and Janet Douglas, *India's Democracy* (New York: Norton, 1972), 51-54, 71, 79-80; Thomas A. Rusch, "Dynamics of Socialist Leadership in India," in Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, eds. *Leadership and Political Institutions in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 188-210.
120. In November 1950 the Socialist Party of India declared that Tibet was "without doubt" an independent country, and China's aggression an act against Asia and the world, the Tibetan people and India. See Rammonohar Lohia, *Himalayan Policy for India,* (Socialist Party of India, 1950).
121. Maxwell, 102-103; Patterson, *Tibet in Revolt* 160, 188-89, "Flight From Tibet," *New York Times,* June 3, 1959, 23; "Calcutta Convention's Resolutions," *Asian Recorder,* June 13-20, 1959; "Tibet Exiles Went to Ask Nehru Aid," *New York Times,* March 29, 1959, 4:1,2,3. See also the message from the Dalai Lama in "P-SP Silver Jubilee," *Asian Recorder,* November 28-December 4, 1959, 3023-24. In Bombay a split-off from the PSP, the Socialist Party, marched on the Chinese consulate, put up a huge portrait of Mao, and splattered it with eggs and tomatoes.
122. "Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet," *Asian Recorder,* April 23-29, 1960, 3276-77; *New York Times:* "India Parley To Ask Freedom for Tibet," April 4, 1960, 14:6; "Dalai Lama Asks Asia-Africa Help," April 10, 1960, 19:1; "Peiping Is Accused of Tibet Genocide," April 11, 1960, 16:6; "Meeting on Tibet Assails Red China," April 12, 1960, 11:1;
123. Quoted in Sripati Chandrasekann, *Red China: An Asian View* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 198.
124. The chairman of the new party was Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, who had been Governor General of India until the post was abolished in 1950, and then Chief Minister of Madras State. Mr. Rajaji, as he was known, was a well-known conservative and had been invited to address the second conference of the Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom in September 1953.

The president of Swatantra was N.G. Ranga, organizer of the Peasant League and long-time member of the Washington-backed International Peasant Union. *New York Times:* "Revered Rightist, 81, Forecasts a Change in India's Government," April 10, 1960, 22:1; "Nehru Faces Dilemma," March 28, 1959, 3:3,4; "Indians To Fight Nehru," June 5, 1959, 4:4; "New Indian Party Faces Minor Role," June 7, 1959, 26:3; "A New Party in India," June 8, 1959, 26:1; "Nehru Criticized by Indian Here," Aug., 2, 1959, 7:1. "Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet," *Asian Recorder*, April 23-29, 1960, 3276; "Swatantra Party Convention," *Asian Recorder*, April 16-22, 1960, 3267-69; N.G. Ranga, *Fight for Freedom* (Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1968); L. Natarajan, 237.

125. Maxwell, 111-15, 176-78. See also Fifield, 373: "Domestic developments within India contributed to the *detente* between New Delhi and Peking. As a result of political factionalism in an election in 1957, the Communists in the state of Kerala were able to form a government even though they had won only 35 percent of the popular vote, independents they supported accounting for another 5 percent. In July 1959 President Rajendra Pasad of India dismissed the Communist regime of Chief Minister E.M.S. Namboodiripad on charges of misrule, and New Delhi established an interim government to restore law and order, a step which was widely interpreted abroad as a policy of firmness toward Indian Communists. When elections were next held in February 1960, the Communists and the independents they backed increased their popular vote to 43 percent, though they lost heavily in the number of Assembly seats. A non-Communist cabinet was established by a coalition of three opposition parties (the Congress Party, the Moslem League, and the People's [Praja] Socialists) who together had acquired 94 Assembly seats and 53 percent of the popular vote." Cf, Nossiter, 107-108.
126. Jain, 3.
127. Maxwell, 176.
128. *Ibid.*, 177.
129. Khushwant Singh and Saradinu Sanyal, *Two Essays on Professor S. Chandrasekhar* (New Delhi: The 51st Birthday Felicitation Committee, 1971), 11-12, 16-20; *Current Biography*, 1969, 81-83; Sripati Chandrasekhar, *Demographic Disarmament for India: A Plea for Family Planning* (Bombay: Family Planning Association of India, 1951) and *Hungry People and Empty Lands: An Essay on Population Problems and International Tension* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1954); *Population Review: A Journal of Asian Demography*, January 1957, 40; July 1957, 78; July 1962, Foreword. See also the *New York Times* for 1967, February 18, 1:8 and February 25, 1:5; and the survey of grants in the *Asia Foundation Program Bulletin* for June 1962.
130. *Population Review*, January 1964, 118; and Sripati Chandrasekhar, *Asia's Population Problems* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19679) preface. See also the *New York Times* for 1967, February 16, 26:1; and February 19, 27:1.
131. Personal interview, La Jolla, California, June 1973.
132. Singh and Sanyal, 7-11, 21-29; "Too Many People — Is India Facing Disaster," *U.S. News & World Report*, April 3, 1967, 90-93; Sripati Chandrasekhar, "How Is India Tackling Her Population Problem?" *Foreign Affairs*, October 1960, 138-50; Steve Weissman, "Poverty and Population," *Pacific Research*, May-June 1973, 11-12.
133. *Population Review*, January 1959, 76-77; Sripati Chandrasekhar, *China's Population: Census and Vital Statistics* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), preface; Personal interview.
134. Chandrasekar, *Red China*, 62. Chandrasekhar also wrote a series of widely-syndicated newspaper and magazine articles, including "Sino-Indian Relations," *Antioch Review*, Fall 1960, 296-307; and "Red China's Population Problem," *Atlantic*, December 1961, 59-62. See also S. Chandrasekhar and others, *A Decade of Mao's China* (Bombay: Perennial Press, 1960).
135. "Red China's Population Problem," 62; "Sino-Indian Relations," 307.
136. "Red China's Population Problem," 62; *Red China*, 73.
137. *Red China*, 212-13, 215, 227.
138. International Commission of Jurists, *The Question of Tibet and The Rule of Law* (Geneva, 1959) and *Tibet and the Chinese Poeple's Republic* (Geneva, 1960). See also the *New York Times* for 1959, June 6, 4:1; June 7, 16:3 & IV, 10:1; July 8, 8:3; July 25, 5:8; July 27, 24:2 & 16:6; August 23, V, 16:2; November 4, 1:6; November 15, 42:5 & IV, 5:6. For 1960, see June 20, 1:4; June 21, 32:2;
139. See, for example, Moraes, 176-77, Narayan in "Afro-Asian Convention on Tibet," *Asian Recorder*, April 23-29, 1960, 3276, and William O. Douglas, *Towards a Global Federalism*, 75-76: "The work of the International Commission of Jurists — the private organization that goes around the world probing into troubled human rights spots — is revealing. The publicity that its reports bring have had a profound effect. No nation, no tribunal likes to be depicted to the world in uncivilized terms."
140. Sanche de Gramont, *The Secret War* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), 478-79; Hagen 198-200; "Germany: The Reds Remove a Thorn," *Time*, July 21, 1952, 22. The group was also known as the Investigating Committee of Freedom-Minded Lawyers From the Soviet Zone and the League of Free Jurists.
141. John Lineham, "The Soviet Fear of the Law," *American Mercury*. February 1953, 90-91.
142. *Ibid.*, 91-93.
143. Cookridge 174-77; Hagen, 200-202; Reinhard Gehlen, *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen* (New York: Popular Library, 1972), 117.
144. Cookridge, 177-80; Hagen, 196-97.
145. "Anti-Red Abducted After Gun Battle in Western Berlin," *New York Times*, July 9, 1952, 1:3; "Germany: The Reds Remove a Thorn," 22.
146. Cookridge, 375, fn. 4.
147. The American delegates included, Robert J. Storey, soon to be elected president of the American Bar Association; George Maurice Morris, former president of the ABA; Dudley B. Bonsal, brother of Ambassador Philipp Bonsal and former counsel to Nelson Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs; and Professor Paul R. Hayes of Columbia. See Tom Killefer, *Free Lawyers and the Cold War: The International Commission of Jurists," American Bar Association Journal*, May 1955, 417-19; Robert G. Storney, "President's Page," *American Bar Association Journal*, October 1952, 846-47; *New York Times:* "East Germans Try Seven for Spying," July 26, 1952, 3:2; "East Germans Jail 7 As Free Jurist Spies," July 27, 1952, 2:2; "Jurists To Press Reds," July 31, 1952, 3:6; "World Jurists Form Permanent Group," August 1, 1952, 1:3;
148. *New York Times:* "Britain Declines To Give Up Pole," August 25, 1954, 10:1; "Reds Aim to 'Try' Rosenbergs Again," January 7, 1954, 9:6; "City Bar Names 4 to Athens Parley," June 2, 1955, 60:5; "Lawyers Go To Athens," June 12, 1955, 3:2; "Canadian Jurist Named," June 14, 1955, 5:2; "World Law Inquiry On," June 15, 1955, 6:6; "Jurists Reavow The Rule of Law," June 19, 1955, 33:1; *Bulletin of the International Commission of*

Jurists, October 1957, facing p. 1; International Commission of Jurists, *The Rule of Law in a Free Society: A Report on the International Congress of Jurists, New Delhi, India, January 5-10, 1959* (Geneva, 1959); Killefer, 419-20; "Edward Kozera, 42, Aide of Law Group," *New York Times*, August 17, 1965, 33:3; James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera, *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System*, 2nd. Ed. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: George Wahr Publishing Company, 1953), p. i. The CIA's Asia Foundation helped nominate delegates to the Delhi Congress and extended partial support to them. It also provided a small grant to defray certain secretarial expenses. "Leading officials of the International Commission have visited a number of countries in Asia, and have carried on detailed discussions with Foundation representatives looking toward an expansion of program activities in Asia," the Foundation explained. See "Cooperation with International Organizations," *Asia Foundation Program Bulletin*, June 1959, 6. It is perhaps significant that the first secretary-general of ICJ, the Oxford law professor Norman S. Marsh, had served as Lieutenant-Colonel in the British Intelligence Corps and Control Commission for Germany, 1939-46. *Who's Who*, 1972-73.

149. The first chairman of the American Fund was J. Grafton Rogers, former Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic Services. Other leaders were Bethuel Webster and Eli Whitney Debevoisie, counsels to the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany; Whitney North Seymour, who was also a director of the American Committee for Liberation; and Dudley Bonsal. Killefer, 420; *Who's Who*, 1958-59, 1972-73. The British also has a national ICJ unit, Justice.
150. According to the *Times*, the CIA put the money through seven dummy foundations — the Gotham Foundation, Borden Trust, Beacon Fund, Price Fund, Tower Fund, Williford-Telford Fund and San Miguel Fund — which passed the money through the M.D. Anderson Foundation of Houston, Texas, to the American Fund for Free Jurists. It appears from preliminary investigation that other foundations also passed CIA money to the American Fund and from there to the ICJ. *New York Times*, February 19, 1967, 30:1; February 21, 1967, 32:1,2.
151. George Patterson, "The Long Journey Home," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 23, 1973, 29-30. See also the editorial "Himalayan Passes," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 26, 1973, 9.
152. Patterson, 29-30. Patterson also reports that Tibet's "government-in-exile" was considering proposals to Peking to permit the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. In a subsequent letter to the editor, May 21, 1973, 6, Thupten Ningee, acting representative of the Dalai Lama, called Patterson's article "irresponsible" and denied any such proposals. See also the letter from Dawa T. Norbu, editor of the *Tibetan Review*, in the issue of March 26, 1973, 6.

U.S. & Marcos

a review by Lenny Siegel

Guy Whitehead's excellent summary of Philippine-American economic relations in the January-February Pacific Research left one important question unanswered. What role did American business interests in the Philippines play in President Marcos' seizure of absolute power?

Unfortunately, we do not yet know the answer. There are no "Anderson Papers" (Chile-ITT) linking U.S. corporations to martial law, though it is known that Marcos has made promises to curry their favor. On the other hand, we do have some idea of American business' attitudes in the period before the coup. At this point we must collect the pieces of a puzzle which may take some time to put together.

One important piece is a special report issued in 1971 by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S.-Philippines Economic Relations. The report consists of twenty-six pages of "Findings and Recommendations" by a panel of fifteen businessmen, government officials, and academics; individual comments by several panel members; and a 112-page "background paper" prepared by panel members Frank Golay, Thomas McHale, and George Taylor.

Panel chairman was Fred Foy, a representative of Mellon interests, and the group included the President and two Vice-Presidents of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce, which traditionally has represented the largest U.S. firms active in the Philippines.

The report appeared before the two significant, August, 1972 decisions of the Philippines Supreme Court. The panel members discussed the pending Quasha case, in which the court eventually ruled that U.S. investors would have to surrender land acquired under parity rights, when the Laurel-Langley agreement expires in 1974. The panel believed that the court would rule in favor of U.S. landowners, but considered the contingency of the alternative decision. The panel did not discuss the pending Lustoveco case, in which the court decided that Americans (foreigners) would no longer be able to hold positions of authority in most Philippines companies.

Both the panel and the authors of the background paper recognized that Philippine nationalism is strong and rising. Despite the existence of the Laurel-Langley agreement, much of the preferential treatment accorded U.S. investors has eroded. Philippine government regulation of utilities has virtually driven U.S. investment from that sector, and a statutory limitation on landholdings has prevented the growth of large plantations (except by lease).

Even before the Quasha and Lustoveco decisions, U.S. companies were disinvesting. The panel wrote:

> Because cases are not decided, American firms in many instances will continue to protect themselves by altering the form of their operations or the pattern of ownership so that they can continue to function in areas which are subject to the citizenship provisions of the Philippine Constitution. (p. 16)

The panel predicted further Filipinization (transfer of sixty percent ownership to Filipino nationals) of several sectors of the economy, such as extractive industries, transportation, and banking, by the mid-70's. But it did not expect full nationalization of foreign investment. The panelists expected full compensation from the Philippines government or private sector for any transfers of ownership.

The panel's recommendations, cloaked at first in third person, appeared to endorse the negotiation of a limited trade and investment treaty between the U.S. and the Philippines, to take force in 1974 upon the expiration of Laurel-Langley. The panel suggested:

The topics covered should give particular attention to

insuring equitable treatment for U.S. interests acquired before and during the period of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, including vested land and stock ownership, franchises, contracts, licenses, and other property. (page 25)

The panel discussed the role the U.S. government might play in serving U.S. corporate interests in the Philippines:

> The U.S. Government, of necessity, must give high priority to maintaining harmonious diplomatic relations with the Philippines. The State Department, nevertheless, should continue to try to influence the Philippines government in seeking justice for U.S. economic interests and equal protection under the laws. (p. 26)

But the panel was aware of Filipino sensitivity to U.S. power. It declared: "Direct and aggressive attempts to improve the climate for American enterprise almost certainly will be counterproductive . . ." (p. 26). In particular, the panel wrote, "The U.S. policy of not attempting to use our defense commitment to encourage the Philippines to favor U.S. investment is considered wise and prudent" (p. 21). But it adds, "Our military presence in the western Pacific continues to exert an indirect impact on our investment position in the Philippines" (p. 22). While pointing to the immense importance of the U.S. sugar quota allocation to the Philippines, the panel wrote:

> Its value for improving the climate for U.S. investment is doubtful. A reduction in the quota . . . can only intensify difficulties for American business that are already there (p. 9).

Since diplomacy on the governmental level probably would not be too effective, the panel suggested:

> American private enterprise must look primarily to its own resources, using whatever influence that can be mustered to work out mutual and private agreements to protect particular private economic positions (p. 26).

The panel recommended bringing the "benefits from foreign investment" to the attention of the Filipinos. It also suggested a role for universities and American philanthropic foundations.

COMMENTS OF MEMBERS

The panelists' diverging viewpoints can be discerned from the appended individual comments. Anthony Macleod, a Vice-President of the powerful Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce, urged closer U.S. ties with the Philippines economy:

> What is needed for a long-term solution is to speed up industrialization by increasing the inflow of foreign capital. This can come about only if the Filipinos will intensify their efforts to attract more foreign capital. It would be constructive to study the investment climate of other Asian nations that have been more successful in this respect (p. 150).

Clayton Seitz of American International Underwriters agreed: "Forced U.S. disinvestment while trying to attract new foreign capital is counter productive" (p. 151).

Cornell University's Frank Golay took a more creditable stance:

> Political power in the Philippines is monopolized by an elite which has shrewdly perfected a system of government which serves the narrow interests of those wielding political power. Present United States policy towards our former colony serves to buttress the Philippine *status quo* . . . Given this state of affairs . . ., it is in the American national interest to sever the economic umbilical cord which still ties our economies . . ." (p. 149).

But only U.S. Congressman Clement Zablocki mentioned intervention in Filipino internal affairs. He suggested that economic aid, military aid, and the sugar quota, "should be employed only after private and diplomatic efforts clearly have failed . . ." (pp. 153-154).

BACKGROUND PAPER

The background paper is a decent, but somewhat biased, summary of U.S.-Philippine economic relations. It is not footnoted, nor is it original.

One section, however, is particularly interesting. According to the backgrounder, Filipino elites have traditionally recognized that the Philippine military establishment "might be used to bolster the political power of (the) President" (p. 76).

CONCLUSION

The Georgetown University report on the Philippines does not answer the question of U.S. involvement in Marcos' decision to seize power. While the Georgetown panel clearly wanted to see major changes in Filipino policy, it wanted to avoid coercion (at least publicly) as a means to its end. It appeared willing to reach an accommodation with Filipino nationalism. The American business interests represented on the panel probably view Marcos' recent actions with optimism, but they recognize that the decrees of the President cannot wipe away the years of building nationalism.

Fred Foy, Chairman
Former Chairman of the Board, Koppers Co.
George Aldrich
Deputy Legal Advisor, State Department
Tristan Beplat
President, Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce; Senior Vice-President, Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Richard Butwell
Chairman, Political Science Department, SUNY College at Brockport
Spencer Davis
Associated Press
Frank Golay
Director, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University
Wesley Haraldson
Former AID Director in the Philippines
Maurice Kogon
Desk Officer for the Philippines, Bureau of International Commerce, Department of Commerce
Anthony M. Macleod
Vice-President, Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce; Senior Vice-President, Ansor Corporation
Thomas McHale
Economic Consultant and Specialist on Southeast Asia and the Philippines
Clayton Seitz
Senior Vice-President and Director, American International Underwriters Corp.
Horace H. Smith
Former Minister-Counselor to U.S. Embassy in the Philippines; Former U.S. Ambassador to Laos
George Taylor
Director, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington
Henry S. Thompson
Vice-President, Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce; President, Insular Lumber Company
Clement J. Zablocki
U.S. House of Representatives

RUNAWAY JOB SURVEYS

Now that Multinational Corporations are an issue in American politics, lobbying groups are publishing surveys and studies purporting to summarize the effects of American foreign investment on domestic employment. Most of these are highly partisan; they explain few of their assumptions. Though all such studies are somewhat arbitrary in their estimates, two stand out.

First, Robert Hawkins of New York University has written a careful methodological essay, a mimeographed paper entitled "Job Displacement and the Multinational Firm: A Methodological Review." He estimates that foreign investment has a relatively small (compared to labor force expansion) impact on the overall (all manufacturing industries) U.S. employment picture. More important, he delineates the assumptions and estimates which must be made to generate a figure.

Second, the U.S. Tariff Commission, armed with a wealth of data, projected three possible results for the domestic job impact of foreign investment. Unfortunately, its methodology is not so clear. (U.S. Tariff Commission, Implications of Multinational Firms for World Trade and Investment and for U.S. Trade and Labor, GPO for Senate Finance Committee, February, 1973, pp. 645-672.)

JAPANESE IMPERIALISM TODAY

Japanese Imperialism Today (Monthly Review, 1973) is the best radical (English-language) presentation to date on the resurgence of Japan as a World Power. Written by Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, it is based on a pamphlet by the authors (published by England's Association of Radical East Asian Studies in 1971).

Japanese Imperialism Today describes Japanese economic and political relations with East and Southeast Asia, China, Australia, the U.S.S.R., and the United States. Though a Marxist analysis underlies the work, it is more factual than analytical. It tells "what," in great detail, rather than "why."

The book describes Japan's heavy dependence upon imported natural resources — oil, timber, metals — to feed its fantastic expansion. The authors point out that most of Japan's raw-material imports come from developed nations, not the poorer nations of Southeast Asia.

Though Japan is America's chief competitor in the world marketplace, Japan is still politically subservient to the U.S. Often Japan is relegated to the role of junior partner in international economic ventures. Chou En-Lai's diplomacy may have forced Japan into a more independent position — at least vis-a-vis China — but the authors don't believe the Japanese will be able to undertake major ventures in Siberia without American participation.

Japan's leading business groups strongly favor expanded business relations with the socialist nations of Asia, but they are also increasing their ties to Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam.

Japanese industry is perhaps more concentrated now than before World War II, but the Liberal Democratic Party which has supervised the reconstruction of Japanese monopoly actually governs the country with minority support.

The book provides an excellent introduction and background to modern Japan, but at times it is too factual — thus tedious. Its scholarly value is limited by the nature of its sources — it relies heavily on secondary newspaper clippings. Nevertheless, at a time when few Western leftists are paying much attention to the World's third largest economic power, Japanese Imperialism Today is a welcome source of information.

INVESTMENT IN JAPAN

Japan Report reports that Japan has eased its restrictions on foreign investment. Foreign investors may hold 100% of the stock of Japanese enterprises in all but twenty-two industrial categories. Seven of those twenty-two are subject to case-by-case screening, while the remaining fifteen have been opened to 50% investment.

By May 1, 1976, all but five industries will be open to 100% foreign ownership. But these five are important: 1) primary industries related to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; 2) mining; 3) oil; 4) leather and leather products; and 5) retail trade operations. (Japan Report, June 1, 1973, Japan Information Service, Consulate General of Japan - New York)

SONY OF AMERICA

Harvey L. Schein, head of the Sony Corporation of America, has described his selection earlier this year as a step in the "Americanization of Sony." Sony, the Japanese electronics producer, recently announced plans for its second manufacturing facility in California.

Schein, formerly a CBS vice-president, first made contact with Sony in 1967, when he negotiated a joint venture, CBS-Sony Records Corp., to produce and distribute Columbia Records in Japan. (Sources: Deborah M. Rankin, Associated Press, Palo Alto Times, June 28, 1973; Wall Street Journal, November 18, 1968)

MEXICAN BORDER INDUSTRY

The U.S. Commerce Department is distributing a State Department Airgram describing the Mexican Border-Industry Program. (Foreign Production and Commercial Report, DIB No. 73-03-294)

Currently some 400 firms, most American, are taking advantage of Mexican government incentives and low labor costs to supply the U.S. market from manufacturing or assembly plants in Mexico. These firms now employ about 49,000 workers in fourteen cities on the U.S.-Mexico border and four more cities in Mexico's interior.

The Airgram lists 368 of the border plants, their U.S. affiliations, their employment, and their products. 160 of those listed are in electronics; eighty-five are in textiles and apparel. 102 plants employing 8,300 workers are located in Tijuana, near San Diego; 79 factories with 8,000 workers are in Mexicali, also adjacent to California.

To counter massive migration toward the border, the Mexican government issued a decree in October, 1972, encouraging similar facilities in most parts of Mexico. Mexico City and other highly industrialized areas are still excluded. Several firms are considering such plants, but none have made definite plans.

The October decree also promised to consider requests from companies that wish to sell part of their output within Mexico, but, according to the Airgram, no such requests have been processed yet. Originally, incentives were available only for plants exporting their output.

The two items in the U.S. Tariff Schedule often credited or blamed for the success of the Border Program actually have little value to the border firms, reports the Airgram. USTS Items 806.30 and 807, which exclude U.S. produced components from duties when re-imported into the U.S., reduce product cost by no more than five percent for most border industries.

ELITE AID LOBBY

America's ruling class has not given up its attempt to rationalize foreign aid. Members of the elite Peterson and Perkins Committee, which both recommended widespread reform of U.S. aid policies in 1969 and 1970, met in Washington June 26 to lobby for passage of the Nixon administration's aid bill. (For background see Steve Weissman, "Foreign Aid: Who Needs It?" Pacific Research, June, 1972.)

The major feature of the Nixon proposal, as summarized by the Peterson-Perkins group, is the shift from "large-scale capital transfers for infrastructure and large industrial plants" to rural development, food production, population planning, health, education, and "human resources development."

They also backed the Export Development Credit Fund, which the House subsequently voted down.

The Committee members recommended that Congress "enact the preferences provisions for manufactured goods from developing countries" in President Nixon's proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973. They emphasized, "The greatest need of the low-income countries is for rapidly expanding trade with industrial nations, and U.S. trade, aid, investment, and monetary policies should reflect this priority."

They endorsed the proposal to re-allocate the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) to increase aid to less developed nations. They also urged that the U.S. increase its contributions to multilateral aid organizations. And they called for the appropriation of $100 million already authorized for the soft-loan window of the Asian Development Bank.

Finally, these "outstanding Americans" endorsed multilateral Indochina reconstruction. "Were all the major powers to undertake, by 1975, a major cooperative effort to rehabilitate Indochina, this could mark not only a closing phase of the cold war, but a starting point for a new pattern of cooperation."

Committee members present included David Bell of the Ford Foundation, the Overseas Development Council's Theodore Hesburgh, Levi Strauss' Walter Haas, Harvard's Edward Mason, and Rudolph Peterson of the United Nations Development Program (formerly head of the Bank of America). Other members, such as David Rockefeller, Eugene Black, and Bill Hewlett concurred in abstentia.
(Source: Congressional Record, July 24, 1973, E50413)

FOREIGN BANKS

"By any standard, the recent expansion of the operation of financial institutions in the United States owned by foreign banks has been very impressive," writes Fred H. Klopstock, an adviser to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. "It has involved not only a spectacular increase in the number of foreign banks with operational presence here, but also a very strong surge in the aggregate assets of those foreign-owned banks that were established here many years ago."

In "Foreign Banks in the United States: Scope and Growth of Operations" (Monthly Review of Federal Reserve Bank of New York, June, 1973, pp. 140-154), Klopstock describes and analyzes the operations of those banks. Foreign-owned banks not only provide services to foreign corporations and operate in the international money market, they provide services for U.S. corporations and even operate retail branches. Financial institutions representing parent banks in Japan, Canada, and Europe have offices in several American states, but most are centered in California and New York.

THIRD FORCE?

In a recent article (New York Review of Books, June 14, 1973), Vietnam scholar Joseph Buttinger describes in moving and horrifying detail the plight of the 200,000 or more political prisoners currently held by the Thieu government in South Vietnam. Buttinger's concern is not merely humanitarian, however. As he concludes, "Only if the press and Congress induce the United States government to force Thieu to open his jails and detention camps is there a chance of developing a political force capable of mobilizing sufficient mass support for a regime dominated neither by Thieu nor by communism in South Vietnam."

Advocacy of a Vietnam "Third Force" — neither right-wing dictatorship nor Communism — is nothing new for Buttinger. Back in 1954, as vice-chairman of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and an organizer of "The Vietnam Lobby," he played a key role in establishing a popular base in South Vietnam (bringing in and supporting Catholic refugees from the North) for Ngo Dinh Diem and American support for his ostensible experiment in Asian democracy.

His latest article draws on his visit to South Vietnam this past April, again under the auspices of the IRC (see Congressional Record — June 26, 1973; S12011). But if the emergence of a "Third Force" was improbable 20 years ago, it is merely absurd today, and there is something pathetic, albeit insidious, about Buttinger's steadfast devotion to an irrelevant idea.

SOUTH ASIA

Now that the sad stories of war and famine in Bangladesh have faded from the newspapers, one must look elsewhere for information on events on the Subcontinent. Fortunately, Monthly Review has just published an excellent reader, Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia (1973), by Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma. Though some of the essays were written in 1971, many have not been widely available. This volume supplies badly needed background and analysis on an area of the world where, though few Americans realize it, the U.S. is deeply involved.

The first section of Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia discusses the impact of Western capitalism on South Asia both before and after the South Asian nations won political independence. The second section deals with the daily lives and changing class relations of villagers in Pakistan's West Punjab and the Tamil Nadu region in India. The third part, a discussion of revolutionary movements in India and Ceylon, includes a version of Hamza Alavi's excellent piece, "Peasants and Revolution." The final section consists of essays on recent events, particularly those following the South Asian War of 1971.

The concluding article — a speech by Pakistani Trotskyist Tariq Ali — differs from the other, academic articles. It is rather refreshing, though somewhat rhetorical. It should not be read alone, for it is not documented. Ali describes the positions of the various Maoist groups — and China — during the rebellion and war in Bangladesh. He predicts that the U.S. and China will reach a Yalta-type accord dividing Asia into spheres of influence, hindering revolutionary movements. Ali is therefore pessimistic. Only when a strong revolutionary party and "people's army" develop does he see a chance for popular revolution in South Asia.

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